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SOME ASPECTS OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
UNDER THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AS
CONSIDERED BY THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE UNITED STATES
By VANCE R. DITTMAN, JR., of the Denver Bar:
Professor of Law, University of Denver College of Late

When a state court admits evidence in a trial of a case before
that court, or when the court uses information outside the evidence after the verdict has been rendered to enable it to exercise
itsofunction of imposing sentence in a criminal trial, such action
by the court may be erroneous and may constitute reversible error.
Whether it does or not is initially a question of state law and
should be determined by the highest appellate court of the state.
Under ordinary circumstances the decision by such appellate court
will be final and will not be reviewed by the Supreme Court of the
United States, simply because no federal question is involved. One
is then within the field of the law of evidence and a further discussion of these problems is beyond the scope of this paper.
In many cases, however, it may be asserted that the circumstances are extra-ordinary, in that the court's ruling is both erroneous and also effective to deny to one of the parties that due
process of law to which he is entitled under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States before his life, liberty
or property can be taken from him by any state. The latter contention may, of course, raise a federal question which requires a
determination by the Supreme Court, and it is with this problem
that this paper is concerned. To state the problem succinctly:
Under what circumstances will the erroneous admission and use
of evidence by a state court have the effect of depriving a person
of life, liberty or property without due process of law, and so
constitute a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States? That such conduct by the state
court will rarely have that effect is clearly shown by the following
discussion, based upon what are believed to be the only cases decided by the Supreme Court on this precise issue.
The Supreme Court of the United States has recently said,
"Rules of evidence, being procedural in their nature, are peculiarly
discretionary with the law-making authority, one of whose primary responsibilities is to prescribe procedures for enforcing its
laws." ' This declaration by the Court amounts to a re-affirmation
of a well established rule that the final determination of the admissibility and of the use of evidence rests with the state courts,
without restraint imposed by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, leaving to each state the power to prescribe
the evidence which is to be received in its own courts.2 The state
Salsburg v. State of Maryland, 346 U. S. 545, 74 S. Ct. 280 (1954).
Hawes v. Georgia, 258 U. S. 1, 12 S. Ct. 204, 66 L. Ed. 431 (1922).
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court may commit error in its rulings on the admissibility of evidence, but it is settled that the due process clause gives to the
Supreme Court no authority to review such errors, although they
may be material, since they are regarded by the Court as being
of state rules and laws, involving
only erroneous constructions
3
no federal question..
To be distinguished from a merely erroneous ruling as to the
admissibility of particular evidence is an erroneous ruling by a
state court which entirely excludes evidence offered to rebut other
evidence already admitted and which thus forecloses the proponent
of such rebutting evidence from any opportunity to present it.
This kind of ruling denies to the proponent his fundamental riht
to be heard and amounts to a denial of due process. 4 It would
appear that the effect of an error by a state court as being violative of due process or not may well be a matter of degree, and if
the error is serious enough to invade a fundamental right it will
also be treated as a denial of due process and within the proscription of the Fourteenth Amendment. The various specific problems
presented in attacks made upon the admission of evidence of various kinds and of that obtained by a variety of methods will be
considered below. It should be noted that in every case cited the
denial of due process was the basis for the objection to the admission and use of the evidence.
THE ADMISSION OF PERJURED TESTIMONY

It was not until 1935 that the Court was presented with the
question whether the use of perjured testimony constituted a denial
of due process, and then, as it turned out, the question was not
material to a decision, since the petitioner for an original writ
of habeas corpus was held not to have exhausted his state remedies
in California.5 Nevertheless the Court made a significant statement that if the district attorney had used perjured testimony,
knowing it to be such (as the petitioner alleged he had done), that
a conviction based thereon would rest upon a mere pretense of a
trial and would be a denial of due process because such a trial
would be inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of justice.,
This dictum furnished the only clue as to the Court's attitude on
the subject until 1942, when the question again arose upon certiorari to review an order of the Supreme Court of Kansas denying petitioner's application for a writ of habeas corpus. 7 Again
the petition alleged that the conviction had resulted from the use
of testimony known to the prosecuting attorney to be perjured,
as well as from the suppression of evidence favorable to the petirule
upon
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IBuchalter v. New York, 319 U. S. 427, 63 S. Ct. 1129, 87 L. Ed. 1492 (1943).
(1917).
'Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U. S. 103, 55 S. Ct. 340, 79 L. Ed. 791 (1935).
AId. at 112.
Pyle v. State of Kansas, 317 U. S. 213, 63 S. Ct. 177, 87 L. Ed. 214 (1942).
4 Saunders v. Shaw, 244 U. S. 317, 37 S. Ct. 638, 61 L. Ed. 1163
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his allegations, because if they were true they would show a deprivation of rights guaranteed to the petitioner by the Constitution of the United States. This rule was once more approved by
the Court in its dictum in a case decided three years later.s
The use of perjured testimony, in a criminal case, on behalf
of the prosecution, when it is known to the prosecution that perjury has been committed, offends those principles which find their
support in the fundamental conceptions of justice which the Court
has many times said lie at the base of our civil and political institutions. To date the question has not been presented in any civil
action.
It seems equally clear that the burden rests upon the petitioner to prove that the prosecution attorney knowingly made use
of such perjured testimony. If this fact is not established to the
satisfaction of the state court, and it finds that knowledge on the
part of the prosecuting officer was not shown, its finding of lack
of knowledge will not be disturbed where the record shows that
the finding was justified from the facts before the state court.
The Court has held that such a finding is simply the determination
of a state question and presents no problem of due process.9 This
immediately suggests that the Court might find a denial of due
process if the record clearly did not support the finding of lack
of knowledge on the part of the prosecuting attorney. Such a case
has not been before the Court.
From these decisions, then, it seems safe to say that a conviction based upon perjured testimony does violence to the due
process clause only if it clearly appears that the perjured testimony was used by the prosecuting officer with full knowledge of
its falsity, and that unless such knowledge is clearly established,
there is simply no federal question presented.
RECANTATION OF TESTIMONY

Very closely related to the use of perjured testimony is action
by a state court in refusing to set aside a conviction in a case in
which a witness for the prosecution recants after the verdict and
judgment have been entered. Such a state of facts carries a double
implication. It indicates that the conviction may well have been
based upon perjured testimony and that without such testimony
there might easily have been insufficient evidence to establish guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. Whether or not a state court commits
an error of law in refusing to set aside a conviction under these
circumstances is not within the scope of our study. Our problem,
on the contrary, is whether or not a state court which refuses to
set aside such a conviction thereby denies to the defendant his life
or liberty without due process of law.
This constitutional question has been presented to the Court
only once, 10 and the Court very quickly disposed of the problem in
8White v. Ragan, 324 U. S. 760, 65 S. Ct. 978, 89 L. Ed. 1348 (1945).
9 Hysler v. Florida, 315 U. S. 411, 62 S. Ct. 688, 86 L. Ed. 932 (1941).
10Ibid.
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these words: "(Petitioner) cannot, of course, contend that mere
recantation of testimony is in itself ground for invoking the Due
Process Clause against a conviction." The position taken by the
Court indicates quite clearly that the possible effect of perjury on
the jury and the possible insufficiency of the evidence are both
problems which concern the state alone, and that the state's solution of that problem will be of no concern to the federal judiciary.
It should be noted that the record sustained the finding by the
state court that there was no responsibility resting on the state
officials for the use of the allegedly false testimony in the first place.
THE USE OF PRIOR RECORDED TESTIMONY

The use of testimony taken and recorded in a prior hearing
or judicial proceeding is a common device in civil actions, representing a well established exception to the hearsay rule. In a
criminal prosecution the problem of confrontation arises and the
action of a state court in permitting the use of prior recorded
testimony or of depositions, immediately suggests the possibility
of an attack upon constitutional grounds. Strangely enough, however, such an attack has been pressed all the way to the Supreme
Court only once," and on that occasion the facts clearly showed
that the defendants had appeared at the taking of a deposition of
a witness against them and had fully cross-examined this witness.
The use of the deposition at the trial was unsuccessfully challenged
by the defendants under the due process clause, in spite of the fact
that the witness was proven to be a non-resident and permanently
absent. Affirming the conviction of the Court made it clear that
whether the state court erred in its decision on the proper use of
the deposition was not a federal question. It decided the constitutional question of due process by pointing out that the admission
of the deposition was but a slight extension of the common law
rule as to showing of non-availability of the witness and that the
extension was not so fundamental as to amount to a deprivation
of due process, since the defendant had been confronted with the
witness and had cross-examined him. The Court apparently regarded the facts of confrontation and cross-examination as significant, and it could well be argued that they are an essential part
of due process. Whether the Court will say so is a matter of conjecture until a proper case raises the question. A later decision
dealing with this problem indirectly follows West v.
of the Court
1 2Louisiana.
THE USE OF DEMONSTRATIVE EVIDENCE

When there is introduced into evidence the lethal weapon,
the tell-tale bullet, the blood-stained garment, the accusatory forgery, the identifying fingerprints and the marked ransom money,
we meet the familiar objection to the use of such demonstrative
evidence-it is too prejudicial and unduly inflames the minds of
"1 West v. Louisiana, 194 U. S. 258, 24 S. Ct. 650, 48 L. Ed. 965 (1904).
12DeLaRama v. DeLaRama, 241 U. S. 154, 36 S. Ct. 518, 60 L. Ed. 932 (1916).
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the jury! Even if the admission of evidence of this sort might be
deemed to be error, that problem is beyond the scope of this work.
We ask only, is its admission, even though erroneous, a denial of
due process?
The Court has passed upon this question in but two cases, and
both of them involved convictions of murder in the California
Courts. 13 Undoubtedly the evidence in both cases was highly prejudicial-particularly in the Lisenba case-and might well have had
an effect on the jury which was highly prejudicial to the defendant. Nonetheless, the Court could find no denial of due process
in either case, pointing out that the shocking nature of such evidence does not, for that reason alone, render its reception a denial
of due process.
It is doubtful if any general principle can be deduced from
this slight bit of authority, particularly since the Court did not
elaborate upon the doctrine. It does seem clear, however, that the
ordinary objection to such evidence will not avail to support the
contention of a denial of due process. Only future cases will disclose what, if any, elements which might arise will cause such
evidence to run counter to the due process clause.
EVIDENCE OF OTHER SIMILAR OFFENSES

It is a well established principle that evidence of other offenses,
or of acts of misconduct, is not admissible to prove directly the
commission of an act in issue, but that such evidence is admissible
to prove intent, scheme, design, 'common plan or purpose, motive,
identity and the like when any such factor is relevant to the issue
of the commission of the act in question. If a state court erroneously admits such evidence there may be presented the question
whether this error constitutes a denial of due process. Such ruling
by a state court has been challenged in two criminal prosecutions
by the defendant, on the ground that the admission of such evidence deprived him of due process. 14 The Court could find no
violation of any federal constitutional right in either case, pointing out that the Fourteenth Amendment leaves the state free to
adopt a rule of relevance, which it did in both instances, as shown
13 Lisenba v. California, 314 U. S. 219, 62 S. Ct. 280, 86 L. Ed. 166 (1941)rattlesnakes to which deceased had been forced to submit herself by defendant
were admitted into evidence after being identified; Adamson v. California, 332
U. S. 46, 67 S. Ct. 1672, 91 L. Ed. 1903 (1947)-stocking tops found in defendant's room admitted, although they did not match the rest of the stockings
found on deceased's body.
"Lisenba v. California, 314 U. S. 219, 62.S. Ct. 280, 86 L. Ed. 166 (1941)in a murder prosecution for killing his wife, evidence of circumstances which
would show that defendant had killed a former wife in Colorado was admitted
to show intent and design to commit the offense charged; Adamson v. California, 332 U. S. 46, 67 S. Ct. 1672, 91 L. Ed. 1903 (1947)-stocking tops found
in defendant's room admitted, where the tops of deceased's* stockings were
missing, "because this interest in women's stocking tops is a circumstance
that tends to identify the defendant." The tops in defendant's possession did
not match the stockings found on deceased's body. (Rehearing denied 332 U. S.
784, 68 S. Ct. 27, 92 L. Ed. 367.)

268
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by the determination by the state supreme court that the admission
of such evidence was not error under the state rule. It is interesting to conjecture what the result might have been if the Supreme Court of California had found that the trial court had committed error but that the error was not prejudicial and hence did
not require a reversal. Would the Court say that an error in the
application of such a rule of evidence would be a denial of due
process? Would the decision that the error was not prejudicial
be a denial of due process? It would appear that in such a case
the rule that the state is free to determine its own rules as to the
admissibility of evidence might not apply and that then a federal
question would be presented. The Court has not said so, however.
ILLEGALLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE

Evidence which has been seized in connection with an unreasonable search and seizure or as an incident to an unlawful
arrest is commonly described as illegally obtained evidence, although the Constitution itself does not use that terminology. Nor
is the prohibition against an unreasonable search and seizure
spelled out in the Fourteenth Amendment. Many state courts have
adopted the rule that so-called illegally obtained evidence is admissible in their own courts, even though unreasonable searches
and seizures are prohibited by the state constitution. This rule of
admissibility was bound, eventually, to be challenged as a denial
of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, and it is rather
surprising that the first case squarely presenting that issue was
not before the Court until thirty-six years after the amendment
was adopted. 15 In answer to the defendant's contention that the
reception in evidence of his private papers illegally seized constituted a violation of the due process clause by the state, the Court
held that the state's action constituted no viloation of the constitutional guaranty of privilege from unreasonable search and seizure. It is quite apparent that the Court refused to read into the
concept of due process required of the states any restriction on
the power of a state to declare a rule of admissibility of evidence
even though it was seized in violation of a provision of the constitution of the state. Neither the Fourth Amendment nor a similar
provision of the state constitution was to be incorporated by
reference into the Fourteenth Amendment.
6
In later cases this rule has been re-affirmed by the Court,'
which has pointed out that the fact that evidence admitted at the
trial in a state court was obtained under circumstances which would
render it inadmissible in a federal prosecution because in violation of the Fourth Amendment, did not render such evidence inadmissible under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amena13Adams v. New York, 192 U. S. 585, 24 S. Ct. 372, 48 L. Ed. 575 (1904).
26 Consolidated Rendering Co. v. Vermont, 207 U. S. 541, 28 S. Ct. 178, 52
L. Ed. 327 (1908); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25, 69 S. Ct. 1359, 93 L. Ed. 1782
(1949).

July-Aug., 1955

DICTA

ment. On the contrary, the Court stated, in the Wolf case,17 "We
hold, therefore, that in a prosecution in a state court for a state
crime, the Fourteenth Amendment does not forbid the admission
of evidence obtained by an unreasonable search and seizure."
The rule adopted by the Court by these decisions stood unchallenged for only three years, when a startling case reached the
Court from California and afforded counsel for the defendant an
opportunity to test the validity of any such sweeping general principle. This case was Rochin v. California."' The Court now had
to define more closely what it meant by an unreasonble search and
seizure within the rule of admissibility which it had adopted, for
here was a case in which the incriminating evidence had been
swallowed by the defendant after state officers had tried to prevent his doing so and was then removed forcibly from his stomach
by the administration of an emetic. The capsules thus recovered
constituted the major portion of the evidence against him. The
defendant's conviction for violation of the state narcotic act could
not stand if this evidence was inadmissible, and to rule it out would
would require the Court to re-define its rule of admissibility. This
the Court did without hesitation, Mr. Justice Frankfurter speaking for the Court and Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Douglas
concurring specially. The conviction in the state court was reversed
on the ground that these proceedings did more than offend fastidious squeamishness about combatting crime too energetically, but
clearly shocked the conscience, and was offensive to even hardened
sensibilities. The Court pointed out that these were "methods too
close to the rack and the screw to permit of constitutional differentiation" and that to sanction such brutal conduct "would be to
afford brutality the cloak of law."
It appears, then, that a search and seizure may be so brutal
in its methods, so irregular in its form, so shocking to the conscience and so offensive to even hardened sensibilities that the use
of the evidence obtained thereby would be a deprivation of life or
liberty without due process of law if such evidence contributed in
any substantial degree to a conviction. If there is to be found a
standard of conduct which has the condemnation of the Court it
would appear to consist of the use of force to the extent applied
in the Rochin case. That this may well be the real test which the
Court meant to establish as the standard could be said to be illustrated by a Colorado case 19 in which blood was taken from the
defendant without force but while the defendant was unconscious
and another sample after the defendant had regained consciousness without objection from the defendant but without his consent
either and the result of the analysis for alcohol content used
against the defendant. The Court refused to grant certiorari to
Wolf

v. Colorado, supra note 16.

13342 U. S. 165, 72 S. Ct. 205, 96 L. Ed. 183 (1952).

"Block v. People, 125 Colo. 36, 240 P. 2d 512 (1951).
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review the conviction.20 This order, of course, does not indicate
an approval of the method used by the Colorado officers, but may
point a pathway which does not incur such sharp disapproval as
was evoked by the Rochin case.
In the most recent decision of the Court 21 there is found a
confirmation of the suggestion that to require the exclusion of
illegally obtained evidence on the ground that its admission would
constitute a denial of due process force must have been used and
such force must have been exerted against the person. In the
Irvine case the defendant was suspected of gambling, in violation
of the California law. Local police entered the Irvine home by
felonious means, having secured a key by the aid of a locksmith
and having by this means effected the entry in the Irvines' absence.
Once in the home the police installed a microphone and wired it
to a receiver in another building. Thereafter they made two more
entries in the Irvines' absence to change the location of the microphone. The device was in operation for about a month altogether
and enabled the listening officers to obtain incriminating evidence.
The selfsame key once more enabled the officers to enter Irvine's
home when the time was ripe, arrest him and ransack the house,
although they had no search warrant. At the trial the testimony
of witnesses as to what had been heard over the electronic device
was admitted over the defendant's objection which properly raised
the constitutional ground that its admission was violative of the
Fourteenth Amendment. By what appears to us as an inconclusive decision the conviction was affirmed, the opinion of the Court
containing this significant statement: "However obnoxious are
the facts in the case before us, they do not involve coercion, violence or brutality to the person, but rather a trespass to property,
plus eavesdropping." The Court followed the rule of the Wolf
case,2 2 finding that the facts in both cases were substantially identical and refusing to overrule that case because to do so would be
to introduce vague and subjective distinctions in the law of search
and seizure. The decision is inconclusive, we believe, because Mr.
Justice Clark concurred "with great reluctance" on the ground
that the law was settled "and, as such, is entitled to the respect of
this Court's membership." Mr. Justice Black wrote a dissent in
which Mr. Justice Douglas joined; Mr. Justice Frankfurter wrote
a dissent in which Mr. Justice Burton joined; while Mr. Justice
Douglas wrote a separate dissent of his own. Mr. Justice Black
thought that the Fourteenth Amendment should draw unto itself
the Fifth Amendment and Mr. Justice Frankfurter thought that
the principle of the Rochin case 23 applied.
Closely allied to the problem of unreasonable search and seizure is that of wire tapping. The Supreme Court has never over10Block v. Colorado, 343 U. S. 978, 72 S. Ct. 1076, 96 L. Ed. 1370 (1952).
"Irvine v. California, 347 U. S. 128, 74 S. Ct. 381 (1954).
22 Note 16 supra.
" Note 18 supra.
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ruled the Olmstead case, ' 4 which held that in a federal prosecution
the Fourth Amendment did not preclude the use of evidence obtained by wire tapping. If a state court permits the use of such
evidence in a state prosecution will such use be a denial of due
process under the Fourteenth Amendment? The problem has not
been before the Court in that form, but a problem which is germane
to it arose in the case of Schwartz v. State of Texas.2 , It was urged
by the defendant that evidence obtained by wire tapping was inadmissible against him under the Federal Communications Act (47
U. S. Code sec. 605) because of a Texas statute which made inadmissible any evidence obtained in violation of the constitution or
laws of Texas or of the Constitution of the United States. The
defendant did not urge a denial of due process as a basis for
excluding the evidence nor as a reason for reversal, so the case is
not in point on the problem under consideration. However, a statement by Mr. Justice Minton, who spoke for the Court, is significant. He said: "Indeed, evidence obtained by a state officer b
means which would constitute an unlawful search and seizure
under the Fourth Amendment to the Federal Constitution is nonetheless admissible in a state court." This dictum may very well
indicate that the Court would adopt the rule of the Olmstead case
in a state prosecution where a denial of due process is urged,
especially since the Texas statute prohibited the admission of evidence obtained in violation of the Constitution of the United States
and the Court saw no reason to exclude this evidence. Of course,
the defendant did not raise the point himself and the Court was
not obliged to pass upon it, so it cannot be said that the point was
actually decided.
A recent decision by the Court also precludes the possibility
of injunctive relief by a federal court to prevent the use of evidence
in a state court where such evidence was obtained by means which
would have made it inadmissible in a federal prosecution because
taken in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The Court affirmed
the United States District Court's dismissal of the defendant's
petition for equitable relief for violation of the Civil Rights Act
(8 U. S. Code sec. 43) which provides redress against those who
circumstances deprive another of rights under the
under certain
20 Constitution.
TESTIMONY OF AN ACCOMPLICE

Whether the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice who
has turned state's evidence, which has been erroneously admitted
against the defendant, constitutes a denial of due process, is a
problem upon which the Court has had little opportunity to speak.
In the single case where this issue was raised by the defendant 27
the Court disposed of the matter quite summarily by adopting the
"Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438, 48 S. Ct. 564, 72 L. Ed. 944 (1928).
344 U. S. 199, 73 S. Ct. 232, 97 L. Ed. 231 (1952).
Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U. S. 117, 72 S. Ct. 118, 96 L. Ed. 99 (1951).
Lisenba v. California, 314 U. S. 219, 62 S. Ct. 280, 86 L. Ed. 166 (1941).
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simple rule that the Fourteenth Amendment does not forbid a
state court to construe and apply its own law regarding the testimony of an accomplice and that the use of the testimony of one
who turns state's evidence is no denial of due process.
EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH A DEFENSE

In a state prosecution the defendant may take the position
that certain evidence is admissible to establish a defense. If the
state court excludes this evidence it may do so because it decides
that such a defense is not appropriate to the charge and is not
relevant or material, or it may do so because it decides that the
evidence would not sustain the defense, even assuming it to be a
proper one. Such a ruling by the trial court may be erroneous on
either ground. Whether it denies to the defendant the due process
to which he is entitled is another question. It seems clear that
whether the facts sought to be proved by such evidence constitute
a defense to the charge or may be shown in mitigation are purely
questions of state law. The determination of those questions by
the state court is not open to
28 the constitutional objection that due
process was denied thereby.
THE RIGHT TO CROSS-EXAMINATION AND THE
DETERMINATION OF THE SCOPE THEREOF

Whether it is error under local practice to deny to a party
the right to cross-examine the opposing witnesses, and under what
circumstances the right exists is a subject not within the scope
of this study. The problem here is whether an erroneous ruling
by a state court which deprives a party of such right where it
exists constitutes a denial of due process under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Insofar as can be ascertained, the Court has never
had before it a ruling by a state court which had this effect. 2 9The
problem has arisen in hearings before administrative bodies.
Similarly, the same question of due process may be suggested
by a ruling of a state court on the scope of the cross-examination
permitted by the Court. A state may have adopted a rule closely
limiting the cross-examination to matters covered on the examination-in-chief. Or the local rule may be broader and permit
cross-examination on any subject germane to the direct examination. Or it may be still broader and permit cross-examination on
any matter pertinent or relevant to the issues in the case, whether
covered by the examination-in-chief or not. It may be asserted
that the choice of one rule over another is a denial of due process,
or it may be contended that error by a state court in permitting the
cross-examination to go beyond the limits set by the local rule
is a denial of due process. Less than two decades after the adop2Chaplinsky v. State of New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568, 62 S. Ct. 766, 86
L. Ed. 1031 (1942)-prosecution for use of offensive language. Evidence of
provocation and of the truth of the utterances excluded at the trial. Approved.
"Market Street Railway Co. v. Railroad Commission of California, 324 U. S.
548, 65 S. Ct. 770, 89 L. Ed. 1171 (1945).
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tion of the Fourteenth Amendment the Court, in deciding a case
where this issue was raised, adopted the principle that whether
the cross-examination must be confined to matters pertinent to
the testimony in chief, or may be extended to all of the matters
in issue, was solely a question of state law as administered locally,
and was no concern of federal law. 3o This decision would seem
to settle that both the choice of the rule as to the scope of crossexamination and the application of the rule chosen are questions
the determination of which in no way involves due process.
The Spies case:" was one in which no attack was made upon
the cross-examination as not being pertinent to the issues. It was
admitted that matters covered on the cross-examination were
relevant to the actual issues in the case. This leaves undetermined
the question as to due process where the cross-examination is erroneously permitted to extend beyond any issue in the case. It is
suggested that such a ruling would not involve a constitutional
problem of due process, since it is unlikely that it could encroach
upon any fundamental rights of the party, and due process deals
with matters of substance and is not to be trivialized by formal
32
objections that have no substantial bearing on ultimate rights.
If cross-examination is limited, so as erroneously to preclude
questioning on matters which are properly the subject of crossexamination under the local rule, the court comes perilously close
to denying a fair hearing, and may actually violate the principle
that due process requires a fair opportunity to be heard.
THE USE OF INFORMATION OUTSIDE OF THE
EVIDENCE IN IMPOSING SENTENCE

A state trial court may properly use information secured from
records which are themselves inadmissible under local law for
purposes of imposing sentence and determining the penalty in a
criminal case. This is not a denial of due process.3 3 The reason
for this rule was stated by the Court to be that the rules limiting
the use of evidence to establish guilt have always differed from
those relating to the use of evidence to fix punishment, and the
Constitution does not restrict the sentencing judge to evidence
actually received in the trial in open court. To so regard the requirements of due process would be to make it a device for freezing the evidential procedure of sentencing in the mold of trial
procedure, thus hindering, if not precluding, all progressive efforts
to improve the administration of criminal justice. Due process
does not render a sentence void because a judge uses "out-of-court
'*

Spies v. Illinois, 123 U. S.131, 8 S.Ct. 22, 31 L. Ed. 80 (1887).

"Note 30 supra.
Note 29 supra, at 562.
Williams v. New York, 337 U. S. 241, 69 S. Ct. 1079, 93 L .Ed. 1337 (1949)the court used inadmissible records of defendant's criminal activities, short of
actual convictions, and information as to his morbid sexuality to determine
that he was a menace to society and should suffer the death penalty, after the
jury had recommended life imprisonment.
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information" to assist him in imposing sentence, even though the
sentence be one of the death penalty.
It should be noted that the defendant's contention that this
procedure denied to him both the right of confrontation and the
right of cross-examination was unavailing, in the view which the
Court took of the use made of this information. The problem
appears to be quite distinct from that relating to confrontation
and cross-examination as to evidence received on the issue of guilt
as distinguished from that used to determine the sentence to be
imposed.
This is not to say, however, that the state trial judge is under
no restriction imposed by due process under any circumstances.
If he knowingly uses false and untrue records of the defendant's
history which show a criminal record which does not in fact exist,
and then misreads these records to the defendant's disadvantage,
even though the defendant has pleaded guilty, a sentence based
upon such procedures is inconsistent with due process and cannot
stand.3 4 Standards of fairness as shown by a crupulous and diligent search for truth by the sentencing judge are essential. Dishonest records must be excluded and misinterpretation of the
records must be avoided if the requirements of due process are
to be met.
"Townsend v. Burke, 334 U. S. 736, 68 S. Ct. 1252, 92 L. Ed. 1690 (1948)the defendant pleaded guilty in a Pennsylvania court and a false record was
used in the imposing of sentence.

ESTATE PLANNING SERIES
A series of ten discussions for lawyers, accountants, life
insurance personnel, trust officers, and others interested in
estate planning has been announced. Professor Charles E.
Works of the University of Denver, College of Law, will discuss the various types of estate planning devices, with special
reference to the effects of estate,, inheritance, gift, and income
taxes, and practical problems in drafting wills, trusts, and
insurance trusts.
This series will be held at the University of Denver Business Administration Building on Thursday evening, 5:15 to
7:15 p.m., September 29th through December 8th. Fee $20.00.

